On the Trouble at Kent State by Oglesby, Carl
Vietnam Generation
Volume 2
Number 2 Kent and Jackson State: 1970-1990 Article 22
1-1995
On the Trouble at Kent State
Carl Oglesby
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/vietnamgeneration
Part of the American Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by La Salle University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vietnam
Generation by an authorized editor of La Salle University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact careyc@lasalle.edu.
Recommended Citation
Oglesby, Carl (1995) "On the Trouble at Kent State," Vietnam Generation: Vol. 2 : No. 2 , Article 22.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/vietnamgeneration/vol2/iss2/22
On the Trouble at Kent State
Carl Oglesby
It was not until sixteen and a half years after the event, in theNew York 
Times of October 9, 1986, that conservative columnist William Safire 
reported “sitting with [Reagans’ Secretary of State] George Schultz in 1970 
watching and listening to the film of the shooting at Kent State; stunned, the 
former marine said, “That was a salvo.” From the sound, he knew an order 
had been given to fire at the students, and— a good Administration soldier, 
but not one to march over cliffs— he would not accept explanations that the 
shooting had been sporadic.
That is point number one: that the shooting was planned, ordered, and 
intended.
Point number two emerges from a simple reflection on the above fact and 
its completely unambiguous status. Just as with George Schultz, no one who 
has studied the evidence in this case with a half open eye and an unbiased 
mind has ever been able to reach any conclusion other than that the 
shooting was premeditated. Yet despite this fact, the government has never 
done anything at any level to probe for an answer to the obvious questions, 
namely: Who authorized the planning to shoot people at KSU and who gave 
the order to keep the truth from coming out?
Thus, the central facts about the Kent State shootings twenty years later 
are exactly the same as the central facts about the other cardinal assassina­
tions of the Vietnam period, those of John Kennedy in 1963, and of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy in 1968. In each case we confront, first, 
a conspiracy to carry out the actual murder and, second, a second con­
spiracy to cover up the first one.
Nor does it take a blathering paranoia to say so. The evidence of 
conspiracy in the JFK and MLK cases has in fact been explicitly reported and 
acknowledged as such by the U.S. Congress itself, which in 1979, after two- 
year-long investigations reported that JFK was “probably” and MLK was 
“ likely” killed by conspiracies, not by lone, self-motivated madmen. Despite 
pretending to still believe that Lee Harvey Oswald pulled a trigger that day 
in Dealey Plaza, the House Select Committee on Assassinations found and 
reported strong if indirect evidence that Oswald was exactly what he said he 
was in his one confrontation with the media before he himself was mur­
dered— a “patsy.” Oswald’s assassin, Jack Ruby, was found to have had deep 
and extensive tics to precisely the segments of organized crime, the New
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Orleans Mafia under Carlos Marcello and the Miami Mafia under Santos 
Trafficante, that had the strongest motive to eliminate Kennedy.
In the King case, the congress found that James Earl Ray was indeed the 
killer, but that he was operating in cahoots with his brothers and that their 
motive may not have been simple racism but rather a desire to collect a 
bounty that had been placed on King’s head less than a year before by 
southern fascists with links to a shadowy Tennessee organization called the 
Southern States Industrial Council.
As to the Robert Kennedy case, there has been no official investigation 
since that of the Los Angeles police department upon which the conviction 
of Sirhan Sirhan was based,but students of the case (perhaps most notably 
Allard Lowenstein, an aide of RFK’s who was himself subsequently mur­
dered) have produced compelling factual grounds for assuming that here too 
we face a conspiracy of killers, not a lone madman, a conspiracy that was 
itself protected by a higher-level conspiracy of official cover-up artists.
Set in such a context, we must see the KSU killings and their cover up 
as the doings of forces based somehow within the “ legitimate” government 
and capable somehow of subverting the powers of “ legitimate authority” to 
their own ends. These ends were, in all these cases, apparently shaped by 
the Vietnam war and by the fanatical conviction among American ultra­
rightists that the war against Communism justifies any crime against dissent 
and even against the Constitution itself.
This is what we face in the case of the KSU shootings: an effort to 
intimidate the forces of popular dissent, first, by murderous violence and, 
second, by the absolute protection of the guilty principals from the least 
legal penalty. The message is: If your dissent becomes to strenuous or seems 
about to make a real difference, we will kill you where and when we choose 
and you won’t be able to do a thing about it; and we will do it in such a way 
that others look on and understand, so that your death will set an example. 
The politics of the Death Squad.
Why do people believe that political murder works? For one thing, 
surely, because it so often does. As we can now say with great certainty, JFK 
was about to withdraw U.S. military forces from Vietnam and to normalize 
relations with Castro’s Cuba at the moment at which he was murdered. 
When Johnson took over, those plans were out and the era of escalation in 
Vietnam and the militant isolation of Cuba was upon us. The difference 
made by Dealey Plaza was the difference between JFK’s 16,000-man U.S. 
expeditionary force and Johnson’s half-a-million-man army. The difference 
made by the assassination of Robert Kennedy, who had become by the time 
of his death a proponent of U.S. disengagement, was the difference between 
winding the war down starting in 1969 and winding the war to a higher 
intensity, as occurred under Nixon.
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In the case of King, the result was less direct but equally profound. When 
King, “ the Dreamer,” died, the Dream died with him, or at least suffered 
major trauma and prolonged deactivation. The Dream in this case, of 
course, was the proposition embodied in King and his political work that 
nonviolent action within the framework of the U.S. Constitution could in 
fact bring about fundamental change in public attitudes and official policies. 
When King was gone, the stage was left to a generation of leaders who did not 
share King’s vision or values, or who at least felt themselves compelled by 
the circumstances of King’s death to take up a politics of violence, or in the 
parlance of the time, of “direct action.” When the civil rights movement’s 
leadership vacuum was filled by Black Panthers such as Eldridge Cleaver 
and Huey Newton, it was only a matter of a very short time before black 
leadership had been essentially eliminated altogether by the forces of state 
repression. In fact, repression had a much easier time politically with the 
Black Panthers than it had ever had with King’s Southern Christian 
Leadership Council and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. 
Those of us who were close to the Panthers knew that their violence was 
overwhelmingly an expression of rage, grief, and frustration, and that in 
purely human terms it was infinitely forgivable as a reaction to the violence 
visited upon the black community by white fascists and, in particular, by the 
assassination of King.
But this did not mean that Panther violence made the least sense from 
a political standpoint. On the contrary, the only political result of the 
Panther’s explicit and indeed vociferous rejection of nonviolence was to 
confer a kind of retroactive legitimacy on the forces of white repression. 
There are clearly conditions and circumstances in which this would not be 
the case, but for the United States of the late 1960s, any action taken by the 
dissenting forces that tended to move confrontation from nonviolence to 
violence was uniformly negative for dissent. The repressive state was 
always the winner when the movement gave vent to its passions and 
expressed itself in violent ways.
I believe this has a bearing on the Kent State killings.
About two months before the Guardsmen whirled around upon the 
students and unleashed their murderous fire on the Kent State campus, a 
group of young antiwar radicals from Students for a Democratic Society met 
secretly at a townhouse in Manhattan to assemble a bomb— a bomb with 
which they intended once and for all to transcend symbolism and draw 
actual blood. The bomb was powerful and was packed with nails. When it 
blew up accidentally in the basement of the townhouse, it instandy killed 
three SDSers of the pro-violent Weathermen, the faction which earlier had 
overseen the dismemberment of SDS on the grounds that SDS, as an 
organization committed to nonviolence, no longer had a mission to fulfill. 
SDS was in this sense the King of the antiwar movement, and the Weather­
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men were its Black Panthers. Except that in this case, the death of SDS was 
the doing not of a paid outside assassin, but of its own children, children who 
dared in their colossal inexperience and arrogance to believe that they could 
adopt a politics of violence in their struggle with the repressive state and win.
Some victory. Besides killing three of their best people, the only thing 
the Weathermen achieved by the attempt to escalate the level of internal 
violence was to lend urgency and a perverse aura of legitimacy to the forces 
that were already only all too eager to abandon the least restraint and go for 
the movement’s jugular.
I cannot prove that the shooting at Kent State on May 4 was in any direct 
way motivated by the Weatherman townhouse explosion of March 6. But as 
one who went through that period as an activists and was in a position to 
watch the transformation of American attitudes both toward the war and 
toward the antiwar movement, I know for a fact that the movement’s 
apparent adoption of violent means of struggle made it incalculably easier 
for the National Guard to kill white students in Ohio— and for the State 
Police to kill black students in Mississippi ten days later—and get away 
with it.
I freely acknowledge the seeming paradox in this line of reasoning. On 
the one hand, the powers of state repression would never have permitted the 
victory of the nonviolent antiwar movement without at last adopting violent 
counter-measures against it. That is to say, nonviolent activists cannot 
expect their nonviolence to be a shield. On the other hand, I am saying that 
the abandonment of the posture of nonviolence and the adoption of physical 
intimidation as a mode of political struggle provided a kind of legitimacy to 
repression, a hunting license, which repression would otherwise have 
lacked, as in a certain respect the Weathermen provided a kind of license to 
the individual National Guardsmen who agreed and planned to shoot to kill 
unarmed students.
But there really is not contradiction here. Nothing the movement could 
have done in the 1960s would have kept the Nixon state from loading live 
ammunition. Rewind the tape and play through those days again with the 
Weatherman madness deleted, and still repression would fire its guns, just 
as repression had fired its guns in the Battle of People’s Park in Berkeley in 
May, 1969— ten months before the explosion at the townhouse. But 
perhaps—-just perhaps— the guns of repression could not have been fired so 
easily in the absence of what many would have regarded as direct provoca­
tion. And perhaps— again, just perhaps— once they were fired, the willing­
ness to let the assassins get away with it might not have been so widespread 
within the general population.
This is of course totally speculative. There is no way in the world to 
prove that the beginnings of the May 4 shooting are perhaps in part to be 
found in the self-bombing o f March 6. But I am at the same time convinced
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that there is a symbolic if not an actual connection between these two grim 
events, and that the lessons of Kent State cannot be fully perceived without 
a study of the lessons of the Weatherman townhouse. These events are 
permanently linked in the horrifying dramaturgy of that time, and they need 
to be studied in unity.
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Kent State students take cover from national guard fire. Used by permission of 
Peter Davies.
